Ethiopia’s Delayed Elections, Now Delayed Results
Six days after the initial deadline (1st July), election results in Ethiopia have still not been announced. Results from only 12 constituencies of 445[1] have been released, unsurprisingly, all 12 have been won by the ruling Prosperity party. Whilst the national electoral body has legal leeway in when it can announce results, its lack of communication increases promotes accusations of impropriety and raises political violence risks. Meanwhile, although the incumbent is attempting to continue unabatedly with government business, harm is done to investment promotion objectives.
Significance - Legal but concerning delays
Ethiopia’s 21 June election process was accompanied by numerous complaints ranging from denying observers access to polling stations to violence against party agents. And now, at the time of writing, only 12 of 445 constituency results had been announced – with the ruling Prosperity Party victorious in all twelve. Results should have been published on 26 June but there are legal caveats that would allow for delays. A press release issued by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) on 25 June stated that complaints at constituency levels can hold up the announcement of results by up to 20 days. However, it is not clear if any of the announced results have yet been contested.
In a briefing, the NEBE said that it has consulted with parties on how to move proceed with their complaints[2] but has shared no further insight. Its last public statement came on 1 July and no timetable for further announcements has been given. Although the NEBE has given reasons why a delay may be possible, it has not given any official reason for the current delay. Up until this point, the 2021 elections could be described as the most transparent election held in the country, notwithstanding the exclusion of certain parts of the country from the process[3]. However, the current delay and accompanying silence opens the door for additional accusations of impropriety. That tension is correlated with risks of business interruption and political violence, which threaten investor confidence at a strategically inopportune moment. See: Ethiopia's FDI policy produces telecommunications and mining gains.
Amid the delays, incumbent prime minister Abiy Ahmed is very much carrying on with business as usual. He has been pushing his economic reform agenda[4], posturing and propagandising over the conflict in Tigray and proceeding with the second filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – much to the chagrin of Egypt and Sudan. Although the continuation of this largely nationalistic agenda continues to win significant support, a quiet section of society, detractors of Prosperity and Ahmed have heavy demands. For example, a human rights lawyer and activist based in Addis Ababa with whom we spoke was calling for a ‘painful but necessary’ transitional government alongside a reconciliation commission to resolve the numerous historical ethnic tensions.
Outlook - Elevated political and security risks to remain
That Ahmed will be re-elected on the back of a majority for the Prosperity Party is not under contention. What is unclear is how much ground will be conceded in the regional council elections. This is where local ethno-centric parties will make their gains, as we have seen in the few results released so far. Challenges to the final results are much more likely at regional level. In the longer term, this will lead to an increased risk of political unrest as regions with greater power will seek greater autonomy. Meanwhile, Ahmed must address the (conduct of) the elections and the situation in Tigray if he is to command the confidence of the investor community. Although the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has agreed ‘in principle’ to a ceasefire[5], the TPLF requirements to formalise the agreement include (a) exit of Eritrean troops, (b) exit of troops from the Amhara region, (c) investigation of alleged war crimes, (d) humanitarian aid, and restoration of services including telecommunication, amongst other things. Political violence risks in the restive regions therefore remains elevated. These elephants in the room provide the largest threats to security, often in economically active regions.
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[1] There are 547 constituencies, but voting was unable to take place in 102 due to various security and logistical challenges.
[2] https://nebe.org.et/en/node/602
[3] The Somali and Harar regions conduct polling in September and no schedule exists for a vote in Tigray.
[4] Which is faltering in the face of the Tigray conflict and uncertainty over the elections.
[5] Getachew K Reda (4 July 2021). Conditions for a negotiated ceasefire.
*image credit: Element5Digital, Unsplash
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